Reverse-griefing yields short-term gain, but the adversary loses in the long term due to waiting time involved in earning the profit and closure of the channel. The mechanism that protects against the myopic strategy is time discounting, counterparty risk, and cheap pseudonyms. The paper assumes that the honest strategy earns more economically than reverse-griefing. An honest-rational party follows the protocol unless a strictly more rewarding strategy exists. There are several factors which justify why an honest rational party would prefer to follow the protocol rather than turn malicious and follow a myopic strategy.An honest node that hopes to continuously earn money may need to wait even longer before somebody forwards through them and is generally paid only a few dozen millisatoshi each time. Fund locked in the contract is a substantial amount, and it acts as compensation in case of misbehavior. It leads to channel closure, which is a costly affair. The solution to avoid reverse-griefing is to add an extra round as preprocessing step before initiating the lock phase and for the off-chain contract to contain two hashes: one for normal payment and one for error. The assumption that at most one party is corrupted under the adversarial model holds true for self-payment.